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China and the United States have been at odds over trade
issues for decades. Since 2011, trade relations with China have
become particularly contentious, especially in the renewable
tB.A., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2007; J.D., University of North
Carolina School of Law, May 2013, M.P.P., Duke University, May 2013. The author
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energy trade arena. In the latest development of these growing
tensions, a group of U.S.-based solar panel companies, led by
SolarWorld, Inc., filed a petition with the U.S. Department of
Commerce (Commerce) and the International Trade Commission
(ITC) alleging that the Chinese government was dumping solar
panels on the U.S. market and providing anti-competitive
subsidies to the solar manufacturing industry.' The agencies made
"affirmative final determinations in the antidumping (AD) and
countervailing duty (CVD) investigations" on October 10, 2012,
and instituted AD and CVD measures against problematic Chinese
products.2  While seeking to promote the U.S.-based solar
industry, the complaining companies started down a path that
cannot serve the U.S. solar industry's supposed goal: to be a world
leader in solar manufacturing. While CVD and AD actions might
provide some relief to U.S. solar companies in the short-term,
imposing duties on China's solar products is not the right strategy
for the United States to employ in pursuit of its goal of leadership
in renewable energy manufacturing.
There are several reasons why imposing CVD and AD
measures against China presents a flawed strategy for the United
States. First, imposing duties reflects a protectionist philosophy
that will not support domestic solar manufacturers.3  Second,
imposing duties could provoke China to retaliate against the
United States further hindering U.S. industries.' Finally, as the
two largest energy users in the world, the United States and China
have common interests in developing a strong global solar
market.' Finally, both countries have goals of reducing
greenhouse gas emissions and de-intensifying their carbon
I See Cassandra Sweet & Ryan Tracy, Solar Firms Seek Duties in China
Dumping Case, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 20, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SBl0001424052970204485304576641292005899326.html ("The U.S. makers are
asking the Department of Commerce and the International Trade Commission to impose
a duty on panels imported from China.").
2 DEP'T OF COMMERCE & INT'L TRADE ADMIN., FACT SHEET: COMMERCE FINDS
DUMPING & SUBSIDIZATION OF CRYSTALLINE SILICON PHOTOVOLTAIC CELLS, WHETHER
OR NOT ASSEMBLED INTO MODULES FROM THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (2012)
[hereinafter ITA FACT SHEET], available at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/factsheets/
factsheetprc-solar-cells-ad-cvd-finals-2012101 0.pdf.
3 See infra Part III.A.
4 See infra Part III.C.
5 See infra Part IV.C.
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economies. 6 If the United States wants to become a world leader
in solar manufacturing, it should stop attempting to hinder the
Chinese, and instead, develop collaborative efforts with China
while focusing on the support of its domestic economy.'
While CVD and AD actions are not the right strategy for
supporting the domestic solar industry, there are other more
productive policy measures the United States should adopt. The
United States should develop a collaborative effort with China to
spur solar manufacturing in both countries and adopt domestic
policies like feed-in tariffs and a federal Green Bank initiative.8
The imposition of duties on China will not help the United States
become a world leader in solar manufacturing.' Other alternatives
exist which will enhance government support to the domestic solar
industry and help the United States become a world leader in solar
manufacturing.
This note proceeds in five parts. Part I provides background
on Chinese renewable energy policies followed by information on
AD and CVD legal framework, under which the solar companies
brought their claims. Part II explains the SolarWorld petition and
the arguments that justify the imposition of duties. Part III lays
out arguments against the imposition of duties, and provides a
policy analysis for why such measures are harmful to the
development of a strong U.S. solar industry. Part IV examines the
common goals of the United States and China with regards to
sustainable energy. Finally, Part V considers alternative domestic
and collaborative policies the United States could adopt to
improve its domestic solar industry.
I. Background
A. Chinese Policies
China entered the global solar market in 2004 in response to an
uptick in demand for solar technologies in Europe; since then,
China has developed aggressive policies to nurture its solar
6 See infra Part IV.C.
7 See infra Part V.
8 See infra Part V.
9 See infra Part V.
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industry."o Most recently, China announced that it intends to meet
twenty percent of its energy needs from renewable energy sources
by 2020" and pledged to provide over $743 billion during the next
decade to support domestic renewable energy industries. 2 The
Chinese Ministry of Finance has developed a special project fund
for renewable energy development to help renewable energy
companies begin manufacturing, expand production, and increase
research. 3
While China broadly publicizes its lofty goals for renewable
energy development, it is almost impossible to pinpoint specific
Chinese policies that distort the solar power markets.14  The
Chinese economy is a "nonmarket economy with a top-down,
command-and-control energy planning process that is often
nontransparent with even more opaque interactions between the
central government in Beijing and the provincial and local
governments when these policies are implemented."" Since China
insists on maintaining a veil of secrecy over its renewable energy
policies, it is difficult to determine whether China is abiding by
Io See Melanie Hart, What Does the Solar Trade Dispute Mean? Shining a Light
on U.S.-China Clean Energy Cooperation, THINK PROGRESS CLIMATE PROGRESS BLOG
(Feb. 9, 2012, 3:26 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/02/09/422282/solar-trade-
us-china-clean-energy-cooperation/ ("By 2007 China had become the world's largest
solar cell production country. By 2008 they were the largest solar panel producer in the
world. By 2010, they controlled almost half of the global market, up from just 15
percent in 2006 . . .. China certainly has a host of policies designed to spur indigenous
innovation across a wide range of clean energy technologies including solar.").
II See Bruce Stokes, Emerging Green Technology Poses Threat of Trade Wars,
YALE GLOBAL ONLINE (May 14, 2010), http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/emerging-
green-technology-poses-threat-trade-wars (depicting China's commitment to renewable
energy development as exemplified by the Chinese wind industry); id. ("In 2009, China
accounted for more than a third of the world's wind-capacity installations, more than
doubling its cumulative installed capacity for the fourth year in a row. And the country
has passed the US to become the world's largest wind-turbine market.").
12 See Nan Sato, Red Dragon Gone Green: China's Approach to Renewable
Energy Technologies, Its Legal Implications, and Its Impact on U.S. Energy Policy, 2011
U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 463, 470 (2011) ("In September 2010, Beijing announced a
$743 billion investment plan in renewable energy over the next decade.").
13 See id (discussing Chinese programs to provide financial support for renewable
energy).
14 See Hart, supra note 10 (explaining that China's failure to provide complete
information regarding its sub-national programs makes it extremely difficult to identify
which policy is at work).
'5 Id
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international trade agreements.16
Experts point to government loan subsidization as one
potentially unfair policy." Chinese manufacturers claim they are
paying market interest rates for China Development Bank loan
guarantees, but local governments actually reimburse the
manufacturers for their interest payments.'" As a result, the solar
manufacturers receive the loan payments without having to pay
normal interest rates.'9
B. Legal Framework: Anti-Competitive Subsidies
World Trade Organization (WTO) rules define and prohibit
certain anti-competitive subsidies. The WTO defines Subsidies,
under Article 1.1(a) of the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (ASCM), as financial contributions to
industry from government.2 0 Not all subsidies are prohibited-
16 See id. (linking the difficulty of determining whether China is following the
international trade agreements to the lack of disclosure regarding China's policies).
17 See Keith Bradsher, On Clean Energy, China Skirts Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8,
2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/09/business/global/09trade.html?pagewanted=all.
18 See id ("[A] state bank is preparing to lend to [Sunzone, a Chinese solar panel
exporter,] at a low interest rate, and the provincial government is sweetening the deal by
reimbursing the company for most of the interest payments, to help Sunzone double its
production capacity. Heavily subsidized land and loans for an exporter like Sunzone are
the rule, not the exception.").
19 See id. ("The bank will lend the money at an interest rate of about 6 percent, but
the provincial government will then give Sunzone a direct rebate to pay more than half
the interest on the loan.").
20 See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, art. 1.1, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, AnnexlA,
1867 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter ASCM], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs
e/legal e/24-scm.pdf (defining that a subsidy exists when "a financial contribution by a
government or any public body within the territory of a Member .. . where: (i) a
government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g., grants, loans, equity
infusion), potential direct transfers of funds or liabilities (e.g., loan guarantees); (ii)
government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected (e.g. fiscal
incentives such as tax credits); (iii) a government provides goods or services other than
general infrastructure, or purchases goods; (iv) a government makes payments to a
funding mechanism or entrusts or directs a private body to carry out one or more of the
type of functions illustrated in (i) to (iii) above which would normally be vested in the
government and the practice, in no real sense, differs from practices normally followed
by governments; or . .. there is any form of income or price support . . . and a benefit is
thereby conferred.") (internal citations omitted).
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subsidies on products and services used and consumed
domestically are allowed under the ASCM framework.2 The
ACSM prohibits the subsidization of products or processes
intended for exportation.22 Further, if a subsidy imposes a
significant prejudice on the interest of another country, it is said to
have an "adverse effect" and potentially gives rise to an actionable
claim.23
The ASCM provides for "consultations" 24 and alternative
dispute settlement procedures 25 if one Member believes another
member country is granting unfair subsidies. Alternatively, the
Member can bring a claim to the U.S. government, requesting
Commerce's investigation of the subsidies and implementation of
CVD measures against the other country.2 6 Under U.S. law, when
a party like SolarWorld files a motion with Commerce, the agency
can begin a countervailing duty investigation. 27  "Before a
countervailing duty can be imposed," the investigation must make
two findings: "(1) that a government subsidy was received; and (2)
that the subsidy resulted in, or threatens, material injury to
21 See Hart, supra note 10 ("Subsidy programs are not necessarily anti-
competitive. Green energy is an emerging technology sector, and policy assistance is
often required to help new technologies compete with existing market alternatives.").
22 See ASCM, supra note 20, art. 3.1(b) (prohibiting "subsidies contingent ...
upon the use of domestic over imported goods").
23 See id. art. 5(c) (including "serious prejudice to the interests of another
Member" as an example of an adverse effect).
24 See id. art. 4.1 ("Whenever a Member has reason to believe that a prohibited
subsidy is being granted or maintained by another Member, such Member may request
consultations with such other Member.").
25 See id. art. 4.4 (providing for the matter to be referred to the Dispute Settlement
Body); see also id. art. 4.5 (allowing for the matter to be referred to the Permanent
Group of Experts).
26 See 21 A AM. JUR. 2D Customs Duties, Etc. § 52 [hereinafter Customs Duties]
("A countervailing duty investigation may be initiated at the request of an interested
party .... In the course of such an investigation, [the Department of] Commerce under
19 U.S.C.A. § 167lb(b) makes a preliminary determination concerning whether a
foreign government provided a countervailed subsidy, and the International Trade
Commission under 19 U.S.C.A. § 1671b(a) makes a preliminary determination
concerning whether the foreign subsidy resulted in, or threatens, material injury to
American industry.").
27 See 19 U.S.C. § 167la(a)-(b) (2012) (explaining that an investigation can be
started whenever the administering authority deems it necessary based on available
information, which could be a filed motion).
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American industry."2 8 Two separate bodies make these
determinations. 2 9  First, the Commission makes a preliminary
determination on whether the subsidy resulted in, or threatens,
material injury to American industry.3 0 Then, the administering
authority makes a preliminary determination concerning whether a
foreign government is granting countervailable subsidies.' If, in
its preliminary investigation, the administering authority finds that
the foreign government provided a countervailable subsidy, it will
suspend liquidation of duties3 2 and "require the importer to furnish
cash deposits as security for duties that may be due pending a final
determination of the amount of a CVD."33 If the administering
authority makes a final determination that the foreign government
provided countervailable subsidies34 and the Commission
determines that U.S. industry was materially injured as a result,3 5
"Commerce then issues an order setting the countervailing duty,"3 6
which is expressed ad valorem.3 7
28 Customs Duties, supra note 26; see also COALITION FOR AM. SOLAR MFG., FACT
SHEET: U.S. MANUFACTURERS OF SOLAR CELL ANTIDUMPING & SUBSIDY CASES AGAINST
CHINA (2011), [hereinafter Fact Sheet: U.S. Manufacturers], available at
http://www.americansolarmanufacturing.org/fact-sheet/ ("SolarWorld Industries
America Inc, .. . filed antidumping and countervailing duty petitions with the U.S.
Department of Commerce and the U.S. International Trade Commission . . .
29 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
30 See 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(a) (explaining that the Commission makes an initial
determination regarding whether there is an indication of injury).
31 See id. § 1671b(b) (allowing the administering authority to determine whether
there is a countervailable subsidy being used).
32 See id § 167lb(d)(2) (establishing a duty on the administering authority to
"order the suspension of liquidation of all entries of merchandise" against the violating
party if a countervailing subsidy is found).
33 Norsk Hydro Can., Inc. v. United States, 472 F.3d 1347, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
34 See 19 U.S.C. § 167 1d(a)(1) ("[T]he administering authority shall make a final
determination of whether or not a countervailable subsidy is being provided with respect
to the subject merchandise . . . .").
35 See id. § 1671d(b)(1) (giving the Commission the authority to make final
determinations as to whether there was material injury due to a countervailing subsidy).
36 Norsk Hydro, 472 F.3d at 1349.
37 See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671d(c)(2), 1671e(a) (setting the countervailing duty at a
certain rate in relation to the countervailing subsidy). An ad valorem tax is tax with a
rate given as a proportion of the price. For example, most sales taxes are ad valorem.
See HARVEY S. ROSEN & TED GAYER, PUBLIC FINANCE 311 (McGraw Hill, 9th ed. 2010).
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C. Legal Framework: Antidumping Subsidies
WTO rules also define and prohibit dumping.3 8 The
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (AIGATT) defines dumping as
the practice of selling goods in other countries at less than home
market price or cost of production.3 9 In other words, "dumping
occurs when a foreign [country] sells a product in [another
country] at less than fair value."40 To establish a prima facie case
of dumping, the importing country must prove: (1) dumping, (2) a
material injury, and (3) a causal link between the dumped imports
and the alleged injury.4 1 The General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) provides that countries complaining of dumping
can impose anti-dumping duties on the problematic products as a
remedy, so long as the duties are not greater in amount than the
margin of dumping.4 2
If an industry believes that a foreign country is dumping goods
or services, it can request anti-dumping remedies from its
government.4 3 The investigative procedure required to implement
anti-dumping remedies mirrors the procedure to determine and
implement countervailing duties described above.44 If Commerce
38 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement), art. 1, Jan. 1, 1995, 1867 U.N.T.S.
154 [hereinafter AIGATT], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal_e/19-
adp.pdf. (explaining that anti-dumping measures will be taken in accordance with Article
VI of GATT 1994).
39 See id. art. 2.1 ("[A] product is to be considered as being dumped, i.e.
introduced into the commerce of another country at less than its normal value, if the
export price of the product exported from one country to another is less than the
comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product when destined for
consumption in the exporting country.").
40 Fact Sheet: U.S. Manufacturers, supra note 28.
41 See AIGATT, supra note 38, art. 5.2 (establishing the requirement that an
application must "include evidence of (a) dumping, (b) injury within the meaning of
Article VI of GATT 1994 as interpreted by this Agreement and (c) a causal link between
the dumped imports and the alleged injury").
42 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art VI.2, Oct. 30, 1947, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/
legale/gatt47 e.pdf ("[A] contracting party may levy on any dumped product an anti-
dumping duty not greater in amount than the margin of dumping in respect of such
product.").
43 Sato, supra note 12, at 475.
44 See 19 U.S.C. § 1673a (2006).
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and the ITC make the appropriate findings, they can impose anti-
dumping duties on the problematic products.45 The applied duties
may not be greater than the margin of dumping.4 6
II. The SolarWorld Claim
On October 19, 2011, on behalf of seven U.S. solar companies,
SolarWorld47 filed a petition with Commerce and the ITC alleging
that China was granting anti-competitive subsidies and that
Chinese manufacturers were dumping solar panels on the U.S.
market, injuring U.S. industry.4 8 SolarWorld is a German-based
photovoltaic (PV) company and is the largest producer of U.S. PV
products.4 9 PV solar panels "convert sunlight directly into
electricity [and] gets its name from the process of converting light
(photons) to electricity (voltage), which is called the PV effect."o
The complaint, which focused on PV cells, modules, and panels,
alleged the subsidies and dumping enable Chinese manufacturers
to sell their products at below market prices and will eventually
drive U.S. competitors out of the market.5 '
The complaint specified "the Chinese government was unfairly
subsidiz[ing] Chinese solar panel manufacturers by providing
land, electricity, material inputs, and financing at below market
rates, as well as direct financial support and other preferential
policies."52 SolarWorld asked the ITC and Commerce to institute
heavy duties to remedy China's unfair policies by imposing duties
45 Id.
46 See ROBERT CARPENTER, ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY
HANDBOOK, US INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, 11-3-11-4 (13th ed. 2008)
(providing a general overview of how AD and CVD actions work).
47 SolarWorld is a Germany based company with expansive operations in the U.S.,
see Our History, SOLARWORLD, http://www.solarworld-usa.com/about-solarworld/
history-of-solar.aspx (last visited Apr. 9, 2013), and major manufacturing operations in
Oregon, see Locations, SOLARWORLD, http://www.solarworld-usa.com/about-solarworld
/history-of-solar.aspx (last visited Apr. 9, 2013).
48 Sweet & Tracy, supra note 1.
49 See Fact Sheet: US. Manufacturers, supra note 28.
50 Solar Photovoltaic Technology Basics, NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY
LABORATORIES, http://www.nrel.gov/learning/rephotovoltaics.html (last visited Apr. 17,
2013).
51 See Hart, supra note 10.
52 Id.
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and tariffs on solar panels." They asked for tariffs up to 250% on
Chinese-manufactured products.54 Such measures would amount
to triple-digit tariffs on solar products from China.
In response, the ITC and Commerce began investigating the
claims in late 2011.56 In December 2011, the ITC issued an
affirmative preliminary determination, ruling that the Chinese
subsidies and dumping harmed U.S. industry, and in May 2012,
Commerce issued a preliminary finding and began to impose
duties on the Chinese products.5 7 In October 2012, Commerce
announced its affirmative final determination and recommended a
continuation of the AD and CVD measures against the Chinese
manufacturers." Commerce found that Chinese producers and
exporters "have sold cells in the United States at dumping margins
ranging from 18.32 to 249.96 percent [and] Chinese
producers/exporters have received countervailable subsidies of
14.78 to 15.97 percent." 59
One month later, in November 2012, the ITC made an
affirmative final determination that the U.S. solar industry was
materially injured by the Chinese imports.60 However, with
respect to the critical circumstances finding required by the statute,
the ITC made a negative determination. In other words, the ITC
did not find the critical circumstances necessary to retroactively
53 See Sweet & Tracy, supra note 1.
54 See MARK BERKMAN ET AL., THE EMPLOYMENT IMPACTS OF PROPOSED TARIFFS
ON CHINESE PHOTOVOLTAIC CELLS AND MODULES I (The Brattle Group, Jan. 20, 2012).
55 See Hart, supra note 10. However, the actual remedy awarded has been limited
by the agencies' findings. See id
56 See Bejamin Romano, Decision in Chinese PV 'dumping' case delayed again to
March, RECHARGE NEWS BLOG (Jan. 30, 2012) http://www.rechargenews.com/
solar/articlel298990.ece (last visited Apr. 17, 2013).
57 See Department of Commerce, Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells, Whether
or Not Assembled into Modules, from the People's Republic of China: Final
Determination, 77 Fed. Reg. 63788, 63788 (Oct. 17, 2012).
58 See id. at 63789; see also Press Release, Solarworld, Solarworld announces
International Trade Commission ruling: Chinese Imports are harming U.S. solar
manufacturing industry (Dec. 2, 2011) [Press Release, Solarworld], available at
http://www.solarworld-usa.com/news-and-resources/news/chinese-imports-harming-us-
solar-manufacturing.aspx (last visited Apr. 17, 2013).
59 ITA Fact Sheet, supra note 2, jj 2.
60 Press Release, SolarWorld, supra note 58.
61 See id.
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impose the AD and CVD measures on the imported goods.62 As a
result, "the antidumping and countervailing duty orders ... will
not apply retroactively to goods that entered the United States
prior to the date of publication in the Federal Register of the
Department of Commerce's affirmative preliminary
determinations."63 Thus, the tariffs on Chinese solar
manufacturers stay in place, but the United States has not applied
retroactive duties to the same products.6 1
III. Pitfalls for the United States
There are significant reasons why the United States should
discontinue the imposition of tariffs on Chinese solar products.
First, imposing such duties reflects a protectionist philosophy,
which will not support domestic solar manufacturers in a way that
will make the United States presence in solar power on the world
stage.65 Anti-dumping and countervailing duties have not helped
boost domestic markets in other industries when the United States
has attempted to use them to spur growth in other sectors of the
manufacturing economy.6 6 Further, the United States and China
trade relations have traditionally been a zero-sum game in which
each country used its comparative advantage to work with the
other.6 ' The solar industry can and should follow this trend.
Second, imposing duties could provoke China to retaliate
against the United States, further hindering U.S. industries.6 8
China has already shown signs of retaliation in response to the
U.S. action.6 9 Finally, as the world's two largest energy users, the
United States and China have common interests in developing a
strong and efficient global market for solar energy.70 Both
countries have goals of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and de-
62 See id.
63 Id
64 See id
65 See infra Part 1II.B.
66 See infra Part I11I.B.i.
67 See infra Part III.B.ii.
68 See infra Part III.B.iii.
69 See infra Part III.B.iii.
70 See infra Part IV.
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intensifying their carbon economies." If the United States is
earnest in its desire to become a leader in solar manufacturing, it
should develop collaborative efforts with China and focus on
supporting our domestic economy, rather than trying to hinder
Chinese industry.
A. Comparative Advantage
In general, CVD and AD policies are considered forms of
economic protectionism that hinder the global free market. First
and foremost, such policies keep countries from achieving
comparative advantage,72 which is the ability of one country to
produce one type of good or service at a lower marginal and
opportunity cost than another country.7 3 One country may be more
efficient at producing all goods (absolute advantage) than another,
but both countries will still gain by trading with each other, as
long as they have different relative efficiencies. 4 U.S. and
Chinese trade relations have traditionally operated under a
comparative advantage regime, in the shape of a "zero-sum game
in which the West develops technologies then China takes
manufacturing business in products that the West can no longer
produce economically."" U.S. and European companies have
excelled in developing cutting edge technologies and fueling
research and development.7 6 The United States has been a leader
in the most innovative technologies, with world-leading research
universities and national laboratories and well-developed financial
71 Joel Eisen, The New Energy Geopolitics?: China, Renewable Energy, and the
"Greentech Race", 86 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 9, 45 (2011).
72 WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, EcoNOMICs: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY
49 (Southwestern Cengage 11th ed. 2009); see also Paul R. Krugman, Is Free Trade
Passe?, 1 J. ECON. PERSP. 131, 132 (1987) (decrying domestic trade policies as
counterproductive to developing the global economy).
73 See Krugman, supra note 72, at 132 ("From the early nineteenth century until
the late 1970s, international trade theory was dominated almost entirely by the concept
of comparative advantage, which we can define loosely as the view that countries trade
to take advantage of their differences.").
74 See BAUMOL & BLINDER, supra note 72, at 49.
75 Thomas Hout, The Sun Rises on Chinese Competition., WALL ST. J. (July 7,
2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487040098045753097219577679
94.html.
76 See id.
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and legal infrastructure.7 7 Complementing this, in the solar
manufacturing market, Chinese companies have latched onto an
older form of solar panels and ramped up production. China's
expertise lies in the "rapid, large-scale deployment of
technologies." 79  For example, a U.S.-based company is
developing a thin film semiconductor process that uses more
expensive raw materials but a cheaper manufacturing process. 0
Chinese companies, on the other hand, have focused on expanding
into an older form of solar panels, using silicon wafers and
ramping up production to new levels.'
Critics of this free trade argument point out significant flaws.82
Most significantly, China has shown signs that it will not continue
to play the role of a low-end manufacturing workshop for the
West.8 Instead, China aims to compete with the United States in
"highly-engineered, research intensive industries" and to move up
the global value chain.84 Furthermore, in some cases, China has
pushed prices down so low, that western companies can no longer
compete.
B. Economic Problems: Empirical Troubles, Trade
Diversion, Job Losses
There are three economic arguments undermining the theory
that protectionist policies are effective at "protecting" domestic
industry: (1) empirical policy problems, (2) trade diversion, and
(3) domestic job losses.
1. Empirical Policy Problems
First, CVD and AD measures are based on models of
77 Steven Chu, U.S.-China Clean Energy Cooperation is Good for America and
Good for the World, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 18, 2011, 7:33 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steven-chu/uschina-clean-energy-coopb_810709.html.
78 Hout, supra note 75.
79 Chu, supra note 77.
80 Hout, supra note 75.
81 Id.
82 See Hart, supra note 10. See generally Krugman, supra note 72 (laying out
several basic criticisms of free trade arguments).
83 Hart, supra note 10.
84 Id.
85 Id.
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imperfect markets that can mislead policymakers into instituting
inefficient and unnecessary measures.8 6 Given the empirical
difficulties involved in modeling imperfect markets, many
economists argue it is impossible to formulate effective CVD and
AD policies. Problems can arise as early as the process for
identifying dumping or anti-competitive subsidy policies in
foreign countries." Given the blunt methods agencies use to
identify unfair strategies, agencies often mistake legal pricing
strategies for proof of an unfair advantage.89 Economists argue
that the policies Commerce and the ITC use to identify policies are
inherently biased to find affirmative evidence of dumping in more
cases than not.90
This is especially true with non-market economy (NME)
countries like China.91 In making its determinations, Commerce
assumes prices on products from NME countries are not a product
of the market economy and do not reflect true supply and demand
because of intervening government forces.92 Commerce and the
ITC use other models to determine the actual fair price of Chinese
products, creating potential empirical problems in their
calculations. 93  The problem is compounded by the non-
transparency of China's multi-level energy policies. 94 Given the
difficulty in determining the existence of unfair policies and the
empirical problems in creating remedies, protectionist policies like
CVD and AD are often a poor solution to domestic market
problems.95
86 See Krugman, supra 72, at 139.
87 Id
88 Id.
89 See generally DANIEL IKENSON, NONMARKET NONSENSE: U.S. ANTIDUMPING
POLICY TOWARD CHINA, CATO INSTITUTE (Mar. 7, 2005) (explaining the methodology
Commerce uses to identify dumping and arguing that Commerce's methods are flawed).
90 Id
91 Id. at 3-4.
92 Larry B. Loftis, U.S.-European Economic Community Antidumping Laws: The
Need for a Comprehensive Approach, 15 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 453, 457 (1985).
93 IKENSON, supra note 89, at 3-4.
94 See supra text accompanying notes 10-19.
95 See Loftis, supra note 92, at 469.
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2. Trade Diversion
CVD and AD policies fail at supporting domestic markets
because of inevitable trade diversion. Trade diversion is the shift
from trade with one exporting country to trade with another
exporting country.96 Studies demonstrate when the United States
implements AD and CVD actions against one country, other
countries begin producing the tariffed products at a higher rate.97
This creates a niche market for other foreign countries to exploit
the U.S. domestic market at the expense of American
manufacturers.9 8
This argument is best exemplified by the consequences that
occurred when the United States imposed CVD and AD duties on
Chinese wooden furniture manufacturers in 2005.9 Many Chinese
furniture manufacturers, who felt the impact of the tariffs, moved
their production facilities to Vietnam, Indonesia, and other Asian
nations where they could maintain a comparative advantage over
U.S. manufacturers by avoiding the heavy tariffs.'00 Before the
United States imposed the tariffs, imports made up about fifty-
eight percent of wooden furniture market; today imports comprise
about seventy percent of the market.'0 ' While the AD and CVD
policies have slowed furniture imports from China, the number of
imports from other countries, like Vietnam, has skyrocketed. 0 2
CVD and AD measures on Chinese solar products will likely
have similar effects, causing trade diversion. Chinese solar panel
96 Paul Carrier, An Assessment of Regional Economic Integration Agreements
After the Uruguay Round, 9 N.Y. INT'L L. REv. 1, 15 (1996).
97 See Andrew Higgins, From China, an End Run Around U.S. Tariffs, WASH.
POST (May 23, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/from-china-
an-end-run-around-us-tariffs/2011/05/09/AF3GRI9Gstory.html.
98 See generally Thomas J. Prusa, The Trade Effects of US Antidumping Actions, in
THE EFFECTS OF US TRADE PROTECTION AND PROMOTION POLICIES 191-214 (Robert C.
Feenstra ed., 1997) (explaining how AD actions cause trade diversion).
99 Higgins, supra note 97.
100 Id.
101 Id
102 See id ("In 2004, before tariffs went into force, China exported $1.2 billion
worth of beds and such to the United States. The figure last year was just $691 million.
Over the same period, however, imports of the same goods from Vietnam - where
wages and other costs are even lower than in China - have surged, rising from $151
million to $931 million.").
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manufacturers have already started taking steps to avoid suffering
the effects of U.S. imposed duties."' Chinese companies have
planned manufacturing sites in Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe,
and Mexico, where they can continue to manufacture solar
products at low cost and import to the United States without facing
duties.'04 It is inevitable that imposing duties on Chinese products
will cause a trade diversion, which in turn, will continue to harm
the U.S. industry.
3. Domestic Job Losses
Traditional AD and CVD critics also argue AD and CVD
measures can negatively impact U.S. jobs. A recent study from
the Battle Group found that increased duties
of the magnitude proposed by the petitioners would result in a
substantial price increase for crystalline photovoltaic cells and
modules. We expect that on average module process would be
higher than currently projected over the next three years by
roughly 25-30% in all consumer sectors (homeowners,
commercial establishments, and utilities). Price increases of this
magnitude may provide some assistance to domestic crystalline
PV producers facing a highly competitive market, but at the
same time will harm consumers, resulting in a drop in overall
domestic demand. 105
Such a drop in demand means that "any job gains from increased
domestic PV module production will likely be offset by job losses
from decreased total demand for PV." 06
The report estimates a fifty percent tariff would create new
jobs from an increase in manufacturing market share. 07 However,
between 9,560 and 10,684 jobs would be lost due to decreased
discretionary spending by PV purchasers as a consequence of
higher prices for PV systems.'o The overall demand reduction
103 Sneha Shah, 4 Ways Chinese Solar Panel Companies are Already Short
Circuiting Future US Import Duties, GREEN WORLD INVESTOR (Feb. 14, 2012),
http://www.greenworldinvestor.com/2012/02/14/4-ways-chinese-solar-panel-companies-
are-already-short-circuiting-future-us-import-duties/.
104 Id.
105 BERKMAN, ET AL., supra note 54, at ES-2.
106 Id.
107 Id. at ES-2-ES-3.
108 Id.
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from higher prices would impact jobs in sales, installation, and
other solar component manufacturing.'0 9 The gain in market share
for manufacturing would thus not create a sufficient number of
jobs to offset the decline in jobs that would result from demand."o
As applied to the current AD and CVD actions, these
traditional anti-protectionist arguments shed light on why the
United States should adopt more effective policies to reach its goal
of being a global solar manufacturing leader.
C. Retaliation Threat
By imposing duties on Chinese solar products, the United
States runs the risk that China could retaliate with its own
measures. China has a reputation for taking retaliatory measures
in response to trade actions filed against it and could take such
action on many levels."'
China could retaliate against the individual solar
manufacturers who brought the complaint. Most likely, China
would impose import tariffs on U.S. manufactured PV products,
reducing the market access of U.S. PV manufacturers." 2 In the
current investigation, six of the seven solar companies who
brought the complaint remained anonymous, in part for fear of
retaliation."' SolarWorld was the only company willing to
support the complaint publicly.' This fear is not unfounded.
According to the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), many U.S.
companies privately discuss Chinese violations of trade laws with
the USTR but do not file formal complaints because they are
worried China will retaliate with tariffs or reduced market
109 Id
110 Id. at ES-4-ES-5.
III USTR's Kirk Says Troubled by China, REUTERS (Dec. 17, 2011 at 3:02 PM) ,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/17/us-wto-usa-china-idUSTRE7BGOJ520 111
217 [hereinafter USTR Troubled by China] (quoting U.S. Trade Representative Ron
Kirk, "I am troubled by what I see as a trend of China to retaliate when members - not
just the U.S., other members of the WTO - bring China to dispute settlement over
legitimate matters").
112 BERKMAN, ET AL., supra note 54, at ES5.
113 Keith Bradsher, Six Companies Stay Anonymous in Solar Case, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 19, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/20/business/global/six-complainants-
in-solar-trade-case-are-unnamed.html? r-1.
114 Id
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China could also take measures to hurt the broader U.S.
economy. Chinese solar manufacturers have initiated a trade
action, similar to SolarWorld's complaint, against U.S. companies
that supply inputs for PV manufacturing."'6 These manufacturers
have called on the Chinese Commerce Ministry to initiate an
investigation into allegations of U.S. subsidies for and dumping of
PV input exports to China.' '7 Furthermore, China could take
measures to limit exports of inputs into U.S. products. In fact,
"China is already limiting the exportation of its rare earth
minerals, which are essential material in the production of wind
turbines."" Even more broadly, China recently imposed
"punitive duties of up to 22 percent on large cars and Sport Utility
Vehicles made in the United States."" 9 Experts view these duties
to be China's retaliatory reaction to the solar industry
investigation.'
Such retaliatory actions would amount to further trade
violations to which U.S. industries could file additional
complaints.12' However, retaliation measures can be difficult to
prove, and more formal complaints would only serve as an
additional drain on the U.S. economy.12   Given these realities,
retaliation to the SolarWorld complaint is a real threat and could
serve to worsen the position of U.S. solar manufacturers.
IV. A Common Challenge
China and the United States have a common goal of
transitioning to a clean energy economy.123  Supporting the
domestic solar industry is just one piece of the larger goal of
115 Hart, supra note 10.
116 Id.
117 Feifei Shen, China's Solar Industry Seeks U.S. Polysilicon Imports Probe,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 21, 2011, 6:05 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-
21 /china-s-solar-industry-seeks-u-s-polysilicon-imports-probe.html.
118 Sato, supra note 12, at 476.
19 USTR Troubled by China, supra note 111.
120 Id ("China's decision to impose duties was widely seen as a tit-for-tat move
after U.S. challenges to China, most recently in the solar industry .....
121 Hart, supra note 10.
122 Id
123 Chu, supra note 77.
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developing solutions to climate change and maintaining domestic
energy resources.124  Climate change poses threats to the United
States and China who both seek to develop clean energy
economies based on renewable technologies like solar energy.'25
Because China and the United States have the same energy
challenges, the two nations should work together to solve their
common problems, rather than escalate into an energy trade war.
Working together will be more effective than attempting to fight
each other through CVD and AD measures.
A. Climate Change
More than any other global problem, climate change poses a
common challenge not only for the United States and China but
for all nations. 12 There is a strong consensus among the scientific
community that the world climate is warming.127 This warming is
the result of an exponential increase in the concentration of carbon
dioxide and other greenhouse gases in the atmosphere since the
Industrial Revolution.'2 8 Driven by industrial processes, fossil fuel
combustion, and deforestation, greenhouse gas concentrations are
now thirty-five percent higher than pre-industrial levels and
continue to rise.12 9 Current projections point to a global increase
in temperature of 2.0 to 11.5 degrees Fahrenheit over the next
century.130
124 Id.
125 See infra Part V.A.
126 PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, A ROADMAP FOR U.S-CHINA
COOPERATION ON ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE 16 (Jan. 2009) [hereinafter ROADMAP],
available at http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/US-China-Roadmap-FebO9.pdf
127 U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, CLIMATE LITERACY: THE ESSENTIAL
PRINCIPLES OF CLIMATE 2 (2d ed., Mar. 2009) [hereinafter CLIMATE LITERACY], available
at http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/education/iiteracy/climate literacy.pdf.
128 Id
129 HERVE LE TREUT ET AL., Historical Overview of Climate Change Science, in
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, CONTRIBUTION OF THE WORKING
GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE 93, 97 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar4/wgI/ar4_wg lfullreport.pdf.
130 RICHARD B. ALLEY ET AL., Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE
2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, CONTRIBUTION TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT
REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 1, 12 (2007),
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg l/ar4 wg 1 fullreport.pdf.
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Scientists agree such increases in temperature will have
devastating effects in China, the United States, and the rest of the
world.'"' In China,
experts have already observed numerous effects of global
warming .... These include extended drought in the north,
extreme weather events and flooding in the South, glacial
melting in the Himalayas, endangering vital river flows,
declining crop yields, and rising seas along heavily populated
coastlines. [T]hese climate change-related impacts . . . will
place additional strains on increasingly scarce resources,
especially water, that could threaten economic growth.132
The United States faces similar threats as well as "a northward
migration of weeds, . . . a decrease in vegetation in arid lands, . . .
increased spread of water-and food-born diseases, and decreased
urban air quality." 33  Reversing the trend of rising global
temperature by dramatically reducing greenhouse gas emissions
poses the largest common challenge of the modem world.134
B. Diferences in U.S. and Chinese Emissions Circumstances
The United States and China are overwhelmingly the largest
contributors of greenhouse gases to the atmosphere, together
accounting for over forty percent of emissions.135  However,
emissions from the United States and China reflect two very
different systems of emissions drivers and opportunities to reduce
emissions.136 In China, economic development is the largest driver
of greenhouse gas emissions.'3 7 Over 1.3 billion people live in
China, more than four times the number of people in the United
States, and as a growing percentage of those people enter the
middle class, Chinese per capita emissions are growing at a rate of
four to six times faster than per capita emissions in the United
States.138
131 See ROADMAP, supra note 126, at 16-17.
132 ROADMAP, supra note 126, at 16-17.
133 Id. at 17.
134 See generally CLIMATE LITERACY, supra note 127, (providing that global
temperature is rising and that this may endanger ecosystems).
135 ROADMAP, supra note 126, at 18.
136 Id
'37 Id.
138 Id.; see also Press Release, PBL, China Contributing Two Thirds to Increase in
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Conversely, in the United States, the primary driver of
emissions is population growth.139 Even though Chinese per capita
emissions are growing rapidly, the per capita emissions in the
United States are still the highest in the world.'4 0 Energy intensity
in the United States decreased significantly following policy
responses to the 1970's oil shocks, but this trend has slowed in
recent years.14' The United States remains far more energy
intensive than Europe and Japan.'4 2 U.S. emissions primarily
come from consumption, not production.'43 Almost seventy-five
percent of U.S. emissions come from transportation and
commercial and residential energy use. 144 Whereas in China, the
vast majority of emissions come from industry and production
development, only twenty-five percent of U.S. emissions come
from industry. 145
C. Still a Common Challenge
Despite these stark differences in the circumstances of the two
countries, China and the United States are confronted with
common energy challenges. Both countries must maintain a
sufficient supply of energy resources to meet the needs of the
growing and changing economies.146 They must reduce the energy
intensity of their economies, increase energy efficiency, and
develop clean energy systems that are less carbon intensive.'4 7
Transitioning to a sustainable energy economy is crucial for the
C02 Emissions (June 12, 2008), available at http://www.pbl.nl/en/news/pressreleases/
2008/20080613ChinacontributingtwothirdstoincreaseinCO2emissions.
139 ROADMAP, supra note 126, at 19 (providing that since 1990, population has
grown by nineteen percent and emissions have grown by nineteen percent in the United
States).
140 Id.
I41 Id.
142 Id
I43 Id.
144 See id. ("Industry accounts for just 25 percent of U.S. emissions, with most of
the rest coming from transportation and commercial and residential energy use.").
145 ROADMAP, supra note 126, at 19 (providing that despite these differences, one
strong similarity between the United States and China is their reliance on coal, the most-
carbon intensive energy source in the world).
146 Hart, supra note 10.
147 ROADMAP, supra note 126, at 20.
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long-term development and success of the U.S. solar industry.
Pursuing trade actions against China will not help the United
States develop a sustainable energy economy and thus will not
help support the domestic solar industry. Trade actions suppress
the international competition necessary to "fuel innovation, bring
clean energy prices down, and speed both of our country's
transitions toward a more sustainable energy economy."'4 8
Furthermore, if the United States successfully hinders Chinese
solar industries through its CVD and AD measures, it could stunt
the development of China's clean energy economy.'4 9 Without
China's efforts in solar and wind energy, "China's rapidly
increasing energy demand and huge spending on [fossil fuel]
technology would add considerably to greenhouse gas
emissions."'s The United States and the rest of the world cannot
solve the climate change crisis without a strong commitment from
China to developing clean and efficient energy technologies. 151
Together, China and the United States are the world's largest
energy producers, consumers, and GHG emitters. If the nations
are serious about moving toward a clean energy economy, they
must work together to reach common goals, not escalate a trade
war.152
V. Solutions
Pursuing AD and CVD duties against Chinese solar panel
manufacturers will not help the United States become a global
leader in solar manufacturing. For the reasons discussed above,
these policies will not reach their intended goals and could have
harmful effects on domestic manufacturers.' 5 3 Instead, the United
States should focus its efforts on developing collaborative
international policies to work with China to reach the nations'
148 Hart, supra note 10.
149 Eisen, supra note 71, at 45.
150 Id.
151 Hart, supra note 10.
152 Chu, supra note 77. Despite the existence of U.S. and Chinese goals, it is
important to remember that if China is helping encourage market competition and
fostering developments in clean energy technologies the United States should support it.
Hart, supra note 10. However, if China is reaching unfair advantages that do not promote
common goals, the United States should identify unfair activities and fight them. Id.
153 Hart, supra note 10.
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common goals of de-intensifying their carbon economies and
growing the global clean energy economy.'54 Additionally, the
United States should implement two specific domestic policies
that will provide the necessary support solar manufacturers need to
create a stronger domestic solar industry.'
A. An International Collaborative Effort
The United States must work with China to develop a global,
sustainable energy economy. Collaborative policies will spur
innovation in solar technologies more effectively and lower solar
energy prices.'56 The United States should initiate a "U.S.-China
Partnership on Energy and Climate Change" with continual
support from the highest levels of government administration. 5 7
The partnership should include several high level task forces that
focus on a number of policy areas in which international
collaboration will be most effective. The first task force should
focus on smart grid,'5 1 through the development of joint smart grid
demonstrations and research initiatives. The inadequacy of
current grid technology has proven a key obstacle in the
widespread deployment of solar technology in both the United
States and China.159  Smart grid research can help both nations
increase solar penetration within the market and spur further solar
development.'6 0 A second task force should determine strategic
areas for joint research and development of solar technologies that
would enable both countries to continually benefit from their
154 See infra Part V.A.
155 See infra text accompanying notes Part V.B.
156 Hart, supra note 10.
157 ROADMAP, supra note 126, at 7, 45.
158 Smart grid is a broad term used to describe a modem, efficient electricity grid
system with advanced communication technologies and distributed generation
capabilities that can accommodate higher levels of intermittent renewable energy. See
generally U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, THE SMART GRID: AN INTRODUCTION 10, available at
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/DOESGBook Single
Pages%281%29.pdf (Department of Energy publication explaining Smart Grid
technology, including the pros, cons, and need for its implementation).
I59 See ROADMAP, supra note 126, at 35 ("Current grid technology used in both
countries is plagued with inefficiencies, and is ill-suited to handle long distance
transmission from sources of renewable power-rich areas to high-load centers, or to
handle the intermittent nature of renewable power sources.").
160 See id. at 8.
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respective comparative advantages. By better understanding in
which phases of production and manufacturing each country has a
comparative advantage, the two countries can work together to
most effectively foster their domestic solar industries. A high
level council "composed of the heads of environmental, energy,
finance, and other relevant ministries and departments" from the
Chinese and U.S. governments should continually manage these
task forces, along with any others that are created.'6' The council
should meet multiple times throughout the year to evaluate
progress and priorities.162  This international collaborative effort
will better support the U.S. solar industry than the current effort to
impose duties against Chinese solar manufacturers.
B. An Effective Domestic Agenda
The United States should adopt two domestic policies to
strengthen its solar industry.
1. Feed-In Tariffs
First, the United States should implement feed-in tariffs for
solar and other renewable energy technologies. Feed-in tariff
(FIT) policies are supply-side policies that focus on supporting the
development of renewable energy generation.'16 In essence, FITs
require utilities to contract to purchase either renewable energy
credits or electricity from renewable energy generators."
According to the National Renewable Energy Laboratory,
[Feed-in tariff] purchase agreements are typically offered within
contracts ranging from 10-25 years and are extended for every
kilowatt-hour of electricity produced. The payment levels
offered for each kilowatt-hour can be differentiated by
technology type, project size, resource quality, and project
location to better reflect actual project costs. Policy designers
can also adjust the payment levels to decline for installations in
subsequent years, which will both track and encourage
technological change. In an alternative approach, FIT payments
161 Id. at 45.
162 Id.
163 ToBY D. COUTURE ET AL., A POLICYMAKER'S GUIDE TO FEED-IN TARIFF POLICY
DESIGN 6 (2010).
164 Id
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can be offered as a premium, or bonus, above the prevailing
market price. 165
Countries within the European Union, in particular Germany,
have experienced success using feed-in tariffs to spur solar and
wind energy development.166  These policies have jumpstarted
Germany's solar industry, enabling its renewable energy sector to
expand seventy-five percent since 2000.167 This includes a three-
fold increase in renewable energy capacity and the employment of
over 300,000 people in the renewable energy sector.168 Deutsche
Bank estimated over 40,000 of those individuals work specifically
in PV.16 9 In terms of renewable energy supply, German renewable
energy production grew from a 4.3% share of total domestic
energy production in 1997 to 15.1% in 2008.170 FITs have been
key in the development of Germany's solar industry and could
provide the same benefits to the U.S. solar industry.17' The United
States should adopt a national feed-in tariff policy to support
domestic solar manufacturing and generation. 17 2
2. Government Financing for Solar Energy
In addition to FITs, the United States can help domestic solar
manufacturers by boosting financial support for the industry.
Despite President Obama's ambitious goal of transitioning to a
clean energy economy by generating eighty percent of U.S. energy
from clean sources by 2035,173 the U.S. government has provided
only a limited amount of financial support for the solar industry.17 4
A federal "Green Bank" initiative, or Clean Energy Deployment
165 Id. (citations omitted).
166 Hart, supra note 10.
167 DEUTSCHE BANK CLIMATE CHANGE ADVISORS, PAYING FOR RENEWABLE
ENERGY: TLC AT THE RIGHT PRICE 44 (2009).
168 Id.
169 Id
170 Id. at 45.
171 Id at 48.
172 Of course, it is important to note, feed-in tariff policies have drawbacks. Critics
claim they are expensive, inflexible, ineffective, and incompatible with other policies.
See id. at 47.
173 President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 25, 2011) (transcript
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/state-of-the-union-20 11).
174 Sato, supra note 12, at 477.
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Administration (CEDA) could take many forms and would
provide several different types of financing for the solar
industry.' Most of the proposals for CEDA support solar
manufacturing through "both direct support (e.g., loans, letters of
credit, loan guarantees, preferred equity or warrants, or risk
insurance) and indirect support (e.g., aggregation and
securitization, re-insurance, and other credit enhancements)."' 7 6
This kind of targeted financial support will help entrepreneurs
"negotiate the 'valley of death' where new technologies languish
for lack of [private] investment support." 7 7
A government-financing program for solar industry has two
primary advantages. First, government support can help U.S. solar
manufacturers focus on developing areas where U.S.
manufacturers have comparative advantages over the Chinese. 7 1
Some CEDA proposals prioritize funding on advanced,
breakthrough solar technologies, capitalizing on U.S. advantages
in research and development.179 In this way, the United States can
continue to use its superior research and development to push
technological innovations from the laboratory to commercial
viability.
Second, government financial support helps attract private
investment. Revolutionary technologies do not usually garner
private investment support during their primary development
stages; thus, government funding at this initial stage would help
attract private investors by reducing the risk involved in investing
in an untested technology.'" For example, NRG Solar's Agua
175 Indeed, Congress has considered several bills over the past five years that
include different types of federal "Green Bank" initiatives. See generally Allison S.
Clements & Douglass D. Sims, A Clean Energy Deployment Administration: The Right
Policy for Emerging Renewable Technologies, 31 ENERGY L.J. 397 (2010) (providing an
in depth explanation of these proposals, how they are structured, and what kinds of
financial support they provide for solar and other clean energy industries).
176 Id. at 403.
177 Senator Jeff Bingaman, Clean Energy Revolution Won't Wait, POLITICO (Sept.
20, 2010,4:46 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0910/42388 Page2.html.
178 See Sato, supra note 12, at 479 (discussing the advantages of government
financing for renewable energy industries).
179 Clements & Sims, supra note 175, at 403.
180 See Sato, supra note 12, at 479 ("The most important role of government
financing in such projects is that it increases the confidence in the viability of these new
technologies and that it brings to public attention the projects' early signs of success.");
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Caliente Solar facility in Arizona has shown how government
investment in experimental technology can encourage private
investment.' 8 ' The Federal Loan Guarantee Program (LGP)18 2
gave a $967 million loan guarantee to this 290-megawatt solar
facility that uses breakthrough technology and will be the largest
of its kind in the world.183 MidAmerican Energy Holdings, Co., a
unit of famed investor Warren Buffet's Berkshire Hathaway, Inc.,
later financially backed the facility.'8 4
Critics of government investment in renewable energy claim
the federal government should not be in the business of taking
financial risks with taxpayer money.'"' Those opposed to the LGP
and the expansion of government financing initiatives for
renewable energy point to the collapse of Solyndra, the California-
based solar manufacturer that received $500 million in loan
guarantees from the federal government before filing for
bankruptcy.'86 Indeed, the decision to provide Solyndra with hefty
loan guarantees could have been a misguided political move
intended to exemplify the success of the Obama administration's
see also Matthew L. Wald, Energy Firms Aided by U.S. Find Backers, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
3, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/03/business/energy-environment/03energy
.html (noting that, in 2009, the US government granted $151 million to "advance 37
clean energy ideas deemed too radical or too preliminary to attract much private
funding").
181 Sato, supra note 12, at 478-79. This plant, funded by a grant from DOE, will use
revolutionary solar technology while powering around 100,000 homes and creating 400
jobs. Id.
182 One aspect of a "Green Bank" initiative Congress passed in 2005.
183 Weekly Clean Energy Roundup: January 26, 2011, IBTIMES UK (Jan. 27, 2011),
http://uk.ibtimes.com/articles/20110127/weekly-clean-energy-roundup-january-
201 1.htm; Sato, supra note 12, at 478-79.
184 Justin Doom & Noah Buhayar, Buffett Plans More Solar Bonds After
Oversubscribed Deal, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 1, 2012),
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-02-29/buffett-plans-more-solar-bonds-after-
topaz-deal.
185 See Solyndra Loan 'Crony Capitalism at Its Worst,' GOP Rep Says, Fox NEWS
(Sept. 18, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/09/18/solyndra-loan-crony-
capitalism-at-its-worst-republican-says/ (citing political statements made in the fallout of
the Obama administration's half-billion dollar loan to the bankrupt solar panel
company).
186 Tim Worstall, Solyndra: Yes, It was Possible to See This Failure Coming,
FORBES (Sept. 17, 2011, 11:30 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/
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stimulus package.'87
However, the LGP is too important to the overall development
of a strong U.S. solar manufacturing industry to eliminate it based
on this one loss. Government financing programs will inevitably
require the government to take risks, but the potential successes
are too significant to require the government to back only proven
technologies, or worse, to eliminate government subsidiaries
completely.'" The LGP and other financing programs are some of
the strongest policy tools the United States holds to fuel
innovation and compete with China in solar manufacturing. These
policies will better support the domestic solar industry than CVD
and AD measures and should not be cast aside based on the
Solyndra mishap.189
VI. Conclusion
If the United States seeks to be a world leader in solar
manufacturing, it should not focus its efforts on imposing CVD
and AD measures on China. CVD and AD measures will not
provide support for, nor will they protect, the domestic solar
industry from international competition. The United States can
adopt other policy strategies that will present better options.
Imposing duties will not allow U.S. manufacturers to capitalize on
comparative advantages and can lead to market distortions like
trade diversion.'90 Imposing duties may also provoke China to
retaliate against the United States, further hindering U.S.
industries.''
As the two largest energy users in the world, the United States
and China have a common interest in reducing greenhouse gas
emissions and de-intensifying their carbon economies through the
187 See id. (arguing the Obama administration should have seen the failure of
Solyndra coming and should not have taken the risk of investing in this particular solar
company).
188 Joe Nocera, The Phony Solyndra Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/24/opinion/the-phony-solyndra-scandal.html? r-1
("Thus, the real question the Solyndra case poses is this: Are the potential successes
significant enough to negate the inevitable failures?").
189 Id
190 See supra Part III.
191 See id
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development of a strong, global solar industry. 9 2  Instead of
pursuing CVD and AD strategies, the United States should
develop collaborative efforts with China and focus on supporting
its domestic solar industry through feed-in tariffs and a Green
Bank initiative. 9 3
United States support for a strong domestic solar industry is
crucial for the development of a clean energy economy. In turn,
the transition away from our fossil fuel economy to a global
economy based on clean energy is of the utmost importance in
facing the climate change crisis. 9 4 The United States must focus
on its domestic industries and work with China to solve the
challenge of global climate change.
192 See id.
193 See supra Part IV.
194 See supra Part IV.
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